Does God possess the power to make contrary choices?

by Matthew

Some (but not all Calvinists) argue for a model of the human will known as Compatibilism. This holds that man has the power to choose to do what he is inclined to do, but will not choose contrary to this.

Bruce Ware explains this position:

But it stands to reason that if we choose to do what we want, then at the moment of that choice, we are not "free" to do otherwise. That is, if I want an apple not an orange, and if my freedom consists in choosing to do what I want, then I'm free to choose the apple, but I'm not free to choose the orange. Freedom, then, is not freedom of contrary choice but freedom to choose and act in accordance with what I want most. It is, as Jonathan Edwards called it, our "freedom of inclination," i.e., we are free when we act in accordance with what we are most stronly inclined to do.
God's Greater Glory, p.80

So because I like wearing flip flops, unless I am going to a wedding or there is an inch of snow outside, I will freely choose to wear flip flops. I do not have the power to make the contrary choice to wear sneakers, boots or loafers, because that is not what I am inclined to do. I have the freedom to follow my flip-flop-wearing nature.

To summarise this:

1. Matthew is inclined to wear flip flops.
2. A person will do what he is most inclined to do, circumstances permitting.
3. Therefore circumstances permitting, Matthew will wear flip flops.

However, we must ask whether this model of freedom should not be applied to God as well as to mankind.

If God's choices arise from His nature we may say that they result from inclinations that He posesses. Let us apply this to God's choices:

1. God was inclined to create the earth.
2. A person will do what he is most inclined to do, circumstances permitting.
3. Therefore God chose to create the earth.

Following this logic we can say that God would not have chosen to do anything other than create the earth. This would apply to all of God's choices, such as electing Abraham, choosing to redeem man through the cross and restoring the cosmos in the eschaton. God did not have the freedom of contrary choice.

Now one could object to premise 2 being applied to both man and God. The Reformed Compatiblist may argue that my choice to wear flip flops is in any completely different category to God's choices. No doubt, but the objector must explain how.

If God's will can be neutral yet be moved by the inclinations of His nature, why can the will of man not be neutral yet moved by the inclinations of his nature? To allow the one but not the other is to make a case of special pleading.

There are two other ways out. One is to argue that God's will is an absolute and utterly independent facet of His personality that posesses a supreme power to make choices indepently of His inclinations. The problem with this strategy is that it absolutizes the will of God in such a way that it sets His attributes in opposition to each other. This is a denial of the simplicity of God and also undermines His moral character.

Alternatively, the Reformed Compatibilist may opt to allow God only Compatibilist freedom. Thus, God would never have made alternative choices to those He has made. The Father would never have done anything but send the Son and the Son would never have done other than come into the world to save sinners.

At times, Reformed Christians can sometimes give the impression that this is the view they take when they talk about election and reprobation as being necessary outworkings of God's nature.

However, to allow God to only posess Compatiblist freedom would have two problems. First, it would undermine the whole project of Reformed theology, namely the upholding of God's sovereign will. Secondly, it would raise questions about the self-sufficency and immutability of God if it was necessary for Him to choose to create the universe and He could not have done otherwise.